When the Edmonton Oilers hit the ice for their season opener on October 9th, the team will be one of the oldest, if not the oldest team in the NHL.
Some of that was by design in terms of the player personal selections made by the Oilers in free agency under the Ken Holland and Jeff Jackson regimes. Some of it related to a particular event that started on August 13th, 2024 and ended on August 20th, when the Edmonton Oilers declined to match the offer sheets for Philip Broberg and Dylan Holloway. The offer sheets were done strategically to maximize the salary paid to each player and minimize the compensation paid to the Oilers if they failed to match.
In short, the Blues took advantage of a salary cap-strapped team that hadn’t signed two of its younger key pieces earlier. With that came the narratives of who was to blame for the circumstances of Broberg and Holloway pulling on St. Louis Blues jerseys. Many have gone after Jeff Jackson and then Stan Bowman for not being more urgent with these two players’ contract situations. Others have pointed to Ken Holland for a lack of focus on getting deals done when they could have happened earlier. Some have pointed out the players didn’t need to sign these deals and could have been more patient and worked with the team.
While I think there is merit in each of these positions, I think there is a more significant issue at play the Oilers were in complete control of that could have helped avoid this situation altogether: each of their development programs.
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The player development planning for the Edmonton Oilers has been a weak spot for many years. In particular, the development program for the Oilers in the AHL has been less than optimal for the last few years. One of the unintended consequences of the Oilers firing Dave Tippett and promoting Jay Woodcroft and Dave Manson create a massive hole in the development focus in the AHL. Woodcroft and Manson were integral in developing many players in their time there. Their commitment to teaching and the fortitude to put players in positions that challenged them regardless of the impact on team results was top-notch. After their departure, the development plan for players really became a hodge-podge. Philip Broberg and Dylan Holloway were the two players who may have been most impacted.
Had that gone differently, the Edmonton Oilers may not have lost Broberg and Holloway this summer.
Who were these players on the day they were drafted?
Before we analyze how the development programs had an impact, let’s take a stroll in the history of each player to understand who they were when they were drafted.
Broberg
Jun 21, 2019; Vancouver, BC, Canada; Philip Broberg poses for a photo after being selected as the number eight overall pick to the Edmonton Oilers in the first round of the 2019 NHL Draft at Rogers Arena. Mandatory Credit: Anne-Marie Sorvin-USA TODAY Sports
Broberg was drafted eighth overall in the 2019 draft, and many panned the pick as being too high for the slot. Broberg had been ranked somewhere in the mid-teens across most media and scouting services. Nevertheless, Broberg brought a series of tools that would entice any NHL team. He’s a 6’4″ smooth skating, left-shot defenseman who defended well with his feet and his length. He also had an excellent understanding of how to move the puck out of his zone by passing and skating. His areas that required development were his in-zone defending and his outright offence.
On the defensive side, he could play softer against the opposition. He could beat to spots by players using their body and lost puck battles to these more physical players. He could also get lost in terms of coverage and allow players to get into high-danger areas he needed to defend. On the offensive side, he lacked the confidence to use his natural skills to create offence for himself and his teammates instead of deferring to others.
Holloway
Dylan Holloway came to the Oilers with the 14th pick of the 2020 draft. The pick was right in range of where Holloway was ranked across many outlets. Holloway came advertised as a physical, fast-skating center who could shoot the puck well. He also had an excellent understanding of the defensive side of the puck in terms of his responsibility in his zone. He also had a commitment to being hardback on the puck in transition plays. In terms of areas of improvement, Holloway lacked creativity in his offensive game and his vision to make plays was not one of his elite skills. In addition, Holloway had played centre for many of his formative years. Given that the Oilers had McDavid, Draisaitl, McLeod, and Nugent-Hopkins on the team, it was clear that Holloway needed to learn the wing.
The injuries
Both players came into the Oiler organization with areas to improve upon, like all of the other prospects. However, these two also had to overcome another similar challenge: injuries.
Broberg’s injury history has been long and complicated. In his draft plus two season, he suffered knee and shoulder injuries. Indeed, they impacted his ability to perform at the World Junior Championships and in each of his first three pro seasons, Broberg missed significant time each year. He suffered lower body injuries to his ankle and to his hip/thigh. He has also had upper body injuries, including shoulder and head injuries.
Holloway’s injury history has even been more challenging. Holloway suffered a very complicated wrist injury at the University of Wisconsin, undergoing surgery and playing with the injury days later in playoff games. Holloway ended up having two surgeries on the wrist, and said recently the wrist is “kind of mangled.” He has also missed significant time with knee and shoulder injuries in his career with the Edmonton Oilers.
Nov 11, 2023; Seattle, Washington, USA; Edmonton Oilers left wing Dylan Holloway (55) fights with Seattle Kraken defenseman Vince Dunn (29) during the third period at Climate Pledge Arena.
What did the Oilers do with these players?
Broberg
The development plan for Philip Broberg in the AHL was quite good, playing escalating minutes in Bakersfield on his natural side. Broberg would play in all situations, even early in his career, with Yanni Kaldis, Marcus Niemelainen and Dmitri Samorukov spelling him in situations when needed. Most of this occurred under Jay Woodcroft and Dave Manson.
Under the tenure of Colin Chaulk, not much changed except the level of responsibility. Broberg played a defacto D1 in all situations, including powerplay. He logged heavy minutes (often over 25 minutes per game) and was counted on regardless of the situation, again playing his natural side.
Issues arose when determining what to do with Broberg in the NHL. The team seemed insistent that he could play his weak side, but other than some time in Sweden in the SHL, Broberg never played the right side. Playing your weak side on an NHL-sized arena is much different than on the larger European ice surface. In addition, to the desire to play him on his right side, Broberg also saw declining minutes despite improving over time. He went from over 13 minutes per game in his first pro season in Edmonton to 11 minutes in his final season with the Oilers.
He also had the additional complication of playing often as the last defenseman in a 7D rotation which made it even more challenging. Only when Kris Knoblauch came in did Philip Broberg get sent down to the AHL to get more reps and build his confidence. This appears to have been the final straw for Broberg and his camp as soon after rumbles of trade requests started to make their rounds in the NHL media.
When Broberg did return late in the Oilers’ season, he did not seem to let it bother him. Broberg ended up on the right side partnering with Darnell Nurse and, while not pretty, the pairing did ok. Certainly, given the stage of the Western Conference Finals and Stanley Cup Finals, Broberg had at least proven he was ready for a bigger role in the NHL.
Holloway
Holloway’s path was even more complicated.
Despite Holloway only playing less than a half season professionally, he was kept by the Oilers to start the 2022-23 season. He was positioned on the wing and played 51 games but very erratically. He would play all over the left side, with a decent amount of his time being spent on the fourth line, with some spot duty on the third line and some showcase moments on the second line. Unfortunately, he was not tabbed to play any specialty teams, so his ice time averaged less than ten minutes.
Holloway was sent down to the AHL in February of 2023 and promptly was injured on a cheap hit from behind, causing him to miss a month of time. When he returned, Holloway was used in a first-line deployment and on both the top power play and penalty kill units. However, the weird part was he was deployed as a centre. This was a natural position for him, and even Jay Woodcroft tried him at the position in the NHL; however, there did not appear to be any rationale for doing this, given his path was blocked unless it was as a showcase for a trade.
When the 2023-24 season arrived, Holloway was once again a member of the Oilers. However, he only lasted until mid-November when injury forced him to miss time and then rehab in Bakersfield. Holloway then proceeded to get called up, only to be sent down and then called up one final time for the NHL playoffs.
Again, his time in Edmonton during the regular season was limited playing only 11 minutes per game on average.
Again, he was slotted mostly as a third or fourth liner, with the occasional foray up into the top six. When the playoffs arrived, so did Dylan Holloway. He, like Broberg, ended up playing a bigger role than he had previously, and played above-average hockey, having some star moments on a line with Leon Draisaitl.
What should have been done?
Nov 20, 2021; Edmonton, Alberta, CAN; Edmonton Oilers defensemen Philip Broberg (86) checks Chicago Blackhawks defensemen Erik Gustafsson (56) during the third period at Rogers Place. Mandatory Credit: Perry Nelson-USA TODAY Sports
Before we get to how this ties into the cost control of young players, we need to visit one last topic: what was the ideal situation for these players?
Now before you start all yelling “Monday Morning Quarterbacking!!!”, I refer you to my postings on the Elon Musk machine over the years. My thoughts on player development as a whole are pretty consistent and I wrote a lot about each of these players.
To start, both players suffered a massive vacuum in player development leadership in their most formative years. These players were drafted by Ken Holland and Tyler Wright. They had the vision for who these players were and could be with proper development. It was incumbent on those two key management people to communicate their thoughts and ensure that plans were built for each player, plans that would be adhered to by their AHL coaches. Keith Gretzky also gets some very modest critique here. While his job is more focused on building the veteran presence around the AHL prospects, he has a direct communication line with the coaching staff. Perhaps, Ken Holland preferred to be the contact, but Keith Gretzky has been around the draft and development aspect of the NHL for a long time. He could have been more vocal and going forward, he needs to be more vocal unless he’s been told otherwise. Nevertheless, Ken Holland and Tyler Wright were not good enough. Period. Full stop.
The only saving grace during part of the Holland/Wright tenure was Jay Woodcroft and Dave Manson. While players before them were lucky to spend a lot of time with Jay Woodcroft and Dave Manson in the AHL, these two did not have much exposure. There was no question those two had plans for each of these players in how they could enhance their NHL chances and were consistent in working with the players. There have been a number of great pieces done by Oilers media, like Daniel Nugent-Bowman of The Athletic, detailing their efforts. Instead, these two and some others ended up working with a very inexperienced head coach at the AHL level. The combination of lack of direction from Edmonton and inexperience in Bakersfield is the biggest reason for the muddled development of these players.
Broberg
Broberg suffered from the twin contract signings of Darnell Nurse and Brett Kulak and the brilliant trade for Mattias Ekholm, and in a calendar year, Broberg was blocked on the left side. As an editorial note, you need to take Ekholm. Nurse’s contract was an own goal by the organization in terms of AAV, which will hurt them for a long time. The one I don’t understand is Kulak. Why four years? If you are so committed to Broberg, why four years? Why not two and see where you’re at with Broberg? Nevertheless, the Oilers signed for four years.
So the Oilers, at that point, should have committed to making Broberg play his weak side. There is no question that this was thought of because there was information out there that Broberg and Ekholm worked with Oilers coaching to sort that possibility out before the 2023-24 season. However, Ekholm was hurt entering the season, and the Kulak-Broberg didn’t click well enough, according to the coaching staff (I don’t agree), during the disastrous start to the 2023-24 season.
What should have been done was for Broberg to play every minute of the exhibition in the NHL on the right side. He should have been sent to the AHL for their camp and season start. He should have been told he would be down there for at least half the season. He should have played the right side in every situation. Not just 5v5. He needed as many reps as possible in as many situations as possible. Notably, when Broberg was sent down, he remained on his natural side. Even when playing with left-shot Ben Gleason, Broberg played the strong side, and Gleason played the weak side. It remains stunning to me the Oilers chose to allow this to happen. Stunning. The Oilers should have decided in January 2024 whether he was ready or whether they were ready for him. Remember, the Oilers were fighting for the playoffs. If he wasn’t ready or the Oilers were not, then it was incumbent on them to continue with him in the AHL. If he was ready, he needed to come up and room needed to be made for him to play.
Sorry, Vinny, but the upside of each player is not close. Broberg needed to play. He needed to play regular minutes and be allowed to work through all the mistakes.
At the very least, the player would have understood his path to the NHL, and it would have had timelines and goals attached to it. I’m certain Broberg would have preferred to stay in the NHL, but there was no question the team had a window to explain to him that a player like him, having the ability to play either side, could make him a lot of money for a long time in the NHL.
Holloway
To be candid, this is a much tougher scenario than Broberg. I remain convinced that Holloway’s best position is at centre as a professional. However, there was no way forward for him during his development years in that role as at least three or four players blocked him. He was always going to be a winger but that doesn’t mean he couldn’t play wing. Indeed, his speed and forecheck capability made him an ideal candidate to be one of the more effective wingers on the Oilers. He played wing for the first part of Holloway’s time in Bakersfield and it made sense given the above. What didn’t make sense is that he began to play centre in Bakersfield when he returned later on. Before his memorable playoff run with the Oilers, Dylan Holloway had played centre exclusively with the Condors, in all situations.
Now, perhaps, the Oilers were looking at a scenario where they were showcasing him, but that seems unlikely, given the trade deadline had passed. It is possible they wanted him to be ready to play centre in the playoffs with the Oilers in a fourth-line role. It is also possible the Oilers were thinking ahead to the offseason regarding Ryan Mcleod and Adam Henrique. Maybe Holloway would be Henrique’s natural replacement as he aged out in a couple of years, and they knew McLeod would be a cap casualty.
For me, the Oilers needed to pick a lane with Holloway. If he was going to be a centre, he needed to stay in the AHL and be a centre, not for fits and starts but for an entire consecutive year. He played 33 games after a terrible wrist injury requiring two surgeries. Even if he were a winger, they needed to start him in 2022-23 in the AHL. It’s too much to ask for a player trying to navigate through the toughest league in the world while still rehabbing a bad wrist. Thirty-three games was not near enough time for him in the AHL. Not near enough. He was just 21 years old when that season started.
I understand why they wanted him up, but they could not have been that convinced of his capability, given he played less than ten minutes a night. Indeed, Holloway gave them a reason to have him in the AHL in his very first game of the season. I think Dylan Holloway needed to play one-half of the 2022-23 season in the AHL, and like Broberg, they needed to set goals for him and firmly establish a position. If you were intrigued by him as a centre stick him and there and tell him to learn the craft with Brad Malone, Greg McKegg and later on, Lane Pederson. Tell him that understanding and playing well at both center and wing makes him far more valuable down the road to his team and it would help him financially in his future. Then, when the 2023-24 season comes along, the Oilers have far more insight into Dylan Holloway as a player.
Apr 24, 2024; Edmonton, Alberta, CAN; Edmonton Oilers forward Dylan Holloway (55) celebrates after scoring a goal during the second period against the Los Angeles Kings in game two of the first round of the 2024 Stanley Cup Playoffs at Rogers Place. Mandatory Credit: Perry Nelson-USA TODAY Sports
What does this have to do with cost control and offer sheets?
This is pretty straightforward. If Broberg were managed as suggested, no team in the world would offer him $9M over two years. He would have had little experience, some reputation as injury-prone, and was far enough from his draft year that it would have seemed risky. Even if St. Louis would have still offered Broberg a deal, there is no question it would have been for a far lower number. In addition, the Oilers’ planning and communication of the strategy with Broberg would have greatly helped. He would have been disappointed, but at least there would have been an understanding of where this was headed and the milestones involved for the player. Then the Oilers most likely have a situation where he can be qualified for one more year or the Oilers could role the dice and try and sign him to a longer bridge deal and commit to him in the NHL. I’m sure people will say the team clearly valued him in the NHL since he was there on and off. Sure he was, but at barely enough playing time to stay loose, let alone develop as a player.
As for Holloway, if the path above was followed, you have a player you know more about by the end of the 2023 season and he could compete for a job with the Oilers in a legitimate role in 2023-24. If he performs, you can pay him, which is no longer an issue. The Oilers could have signed him mid-season after seeing some results at some very favourable terms. If he doesn’t perform, why would anyone offer sheet a player that had struggled as an NHLer? Of course we know Holloway did, in fact, perform on the biggest stage with the rest of the NHL watching. By then it was too late for Edmonton.
In the end, the draft, develop and ripen philosophy of Ken Holland wasn’t followed on either of these players.
Not close. That’s on him and it’s also ironic. Given the potential roles for each player, the injury history of each and the fact each player was blocked at the NHL level, Holland had a chance to use his mantra. Had he done so, it is quite likely the events this summer would not have happened.
It is quite likely both of these players would have contributed to the Oilers in the coming season and for many seasons after that.
